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SLIC: A Selfish Link-based Incentive Mechanism for Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Networks

Sun, Qixiang and Garcia-Molina, Hector (2003) SLIC: A Selfish Link-based Incentive Mechanism for Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Networks. Technical Report. Stanford.




Most Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems assume that all peers are cooperating for the benefit of the community. However in practice, there is a significant portion of peers who leech resources from the system without contributing any in return. In this paper, we propose a simple Selfish Link-based InCentive (SLIC) mechanism for unstructured P2P file sharing systems to create an incentive structure where in exchange for better service, peers are encouraged to share more data, give more capacity to handle other peers' queries, and establish more connections to improve the P2P overlay network. Our SLIC algorithm does not require nodes to be altruistic and does not rely on third parties to provide accurate information about other peers. We demonstrate, through simulation, that SLIC's locally selfish and greedy approach is sufficient for the system to evolve into a ``good'' state.

Item Type:Techreport (Technical Report)
Uncontrolled Keywords:peer-to-peer, incentive, selfish, link-based
Subjects:Computer Science > Distributed Systems
Related URLs:Project Homepage
ID Code:606
Deposited By:Import Account
Deposited On:17 Jul 2003 17:00
Last Modified:24 Dec 2008 11:13

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