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Modeling Reputation and Incentives in Online Trade

Marti, Sergio and Garcia-Molina, Hector (2004) Modeling Reputation and Incentives in Online Trade. Technical Report. Stanford.




Designing an online exchange system presents a challenging undertaking, especially when that system is expected to be decentralized and its members fully autonomous. To facilitate the system architecture and protocol design, it is important to understand the behavior of the users and the impact system parameters play on their actions. In this paper we identify key attributes that drive the actions of users of trading systems, whether they are cooperative, selfish, or malicious. We then present an economic model that captures the behavior of peers in a system that employs incentive schemes and reputation systems to mitigate the effects of freeriding and misbehavior.

Item Type:Techreport (Technical Report)
Uncontrolled Keywords:peer-to-peer; reputation; trust
Subjects:Computer Science > Distributed Systems
Computer Science > E-Commerce
PORTIA (DB-Privacy)
Related URLs:Project Homepage, Project Homepage,
ID Code:662
Deposited By:Import Account
Deposited On:07 Oct 2004 17:00
Last Modified:23 Dec 2008 09:36

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