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Quantifying Agent Strategies Under Reputation

Marti, Sergio and Garcia-Molina, Hector (2005) Quantifying Agent Strategies Under Reputation. In: Fifth IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P 2005), August 31- September 2, 2005, Konstanz, Germany.




Our research proposes a simple buyer/seller game that captures the incentives dictating the interaction between peers in resource trading peer-to-peer networks. We prove that for simple reputation-based buyer strategies, a seller's decision whether to cheat or not is dependent only on the length of its transaction history, not on the particular actions committed. Given a finite number of transactions, a peer can compute a utility optimal sequence of cooperations and defections. With the limited information provided by many reputation systems, a peer has incentive to defect on a large fraction of its transactions. If temporal information is used, equilibrium is reached when peers predominantly cooperate.

Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords:peer-to-peer, trust, reputation, game theory
Subjects:Computer Science > Distributed Systems
Computer Science > E-Commerce
Related URLs:Project Homepage
ID Code:685
Deposited By:Import Account
Deposited On:06 Aug 2005 17:00
Last Modified:22 Dec 2008 18:16

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