Aggarwal, Gagan and Goel, Ashish and Motwani, Rajeev (2005) Truthful Auctions for Pricing Search Keywords. Technical Report. Stanford.
We present a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a web-page assuming that advertisements for different merchants must be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighted) bids. This captures both the ``Overture model'' where bidders are ranked in order of the submitted bids, and the ``Google model'' where bidders are ranked in order of the expected revenue (or utility) that their advertisement generates. Assuming separable click-through rates, we prove revenue-equivalence between our auction and the non-truthful next-price auctions currently in use.
|Item Type:||Techreport (Technical Report)|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Auctions, truthful auction, search engine auctions, online advertising, keyword auctions|
|Subjects:||Computer Science > E-Commerce|
|Deposited By:||Import Account|
|Deposited On:||30 Oct 2005 16:00|
|Last Modified:||19 Dec 2008 10:52|
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