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Truthful Auctions for Pricing Search Keywords

Aggarwal, Gagan and Goel, Ashish and Motwani, Rajeev (2005) Truthful Auctions for Pricing Search Keywords. Technical Report. Stanford.




We present a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a web-page assuming that advertisements for different merchants must be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighted) bids. This captures both the ``Overture model'' where bidders are ranked in order of the submitted bids, and the ``Google model'' where bidders are ranked in order of the expected revenue (or utility) that their advertisement generates. Assuming separable click-through rates, we prove revenue-equivalence between our auction and the non-truthful next-price auctions currently in use.

Item Type:Techreport (Technical Report)
Uncontrolled Keywords:Auctions, truthful auction, search engine auctions, online advertising, keyword auctions
Subjects:Computer Science > E-Commerce
ID Code:696
Deposited By:Import Account
Deposited On:30 Oct 2005 16:00
Last Modified:19 Dec 2008 10:52

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