Mungamuru, Bob and Padilla, Michael and Garcia-Molina, Hector (2007) Collusion and Data Privacy. Technical Report. Stanford.
In certain situations where a firm has an interest in privacy, external parties can be in a position to collude with each other in a manner that violates the firm's privacy. These external parties often have a monetary incentive to collude against the firm. The threat of collusion is discussed within the context of a simple economic model. Although a simple reward scheme can be used to deter collusion, a deterrent based on a long-term business relationship is more effective. An optimal collusion-resistant mechanism is designed with which the firm can filter out parties with low discount factors.
|Item Type:||Techreport (Technical Report)|
|Related URLs:||Project Homepage||http://crypto.stanford.edu/portia/|
|Deposited By:||Import Account|
|Deposited On:||18 Apr 2007 17:00|
|Last Modified:||10 Dec 2008 17:48|
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