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Competition and Fraud in Online Advertising Markets

Mungamuru, Bob and Weis, Stephen (2008) Competition and Fraud in Online Advertising Markets. Technical Report. Stanford InfoLab. (Publication Note: In: Financial Cryptography and Data Security: 12th International Conference, FC 2008, Cozumel, Mexico, January 28-31, 2008)

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Abstract

An economic model of the online advertising market is presented, focusing on the effect of ad fraud. In the model, the market is comprised of three classes of players: publishers, advertising networks, and advertisers. The central question is whether ad networks have an incentive to aggressively combat fraud. The main outcome of the model is to answer this question in the affirmative.

Item Type:Techreport (Technical Report)
Uncontrolled Keywords:Click fraud, economics, advertising
Subjects:Miscellaneous
Projects:Miscellaneous
ID Code:830
Deposited By:Import Account
Deposited On:11 May 2008 17:00
Last Modified:10 Dec 2008 16:03

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